Mario Bunge. Epistemology is here to stay by Gómez, Ricardo J.
Mεtascience | No. 1 | 2020 | Mario Bunge : Thinker of Materiality
Mεtascience | No. 1 | 2020 | Mario Bunge : Thinker of Materiality
Mario Bunge: Epistemology is
Here to Stay
Ricardo J. Gómez1
RÉSUMÉ — Cette étude défend l’idée que, contrairement à l’opinion
de Latour sur la nécessité de laisser de côté l’épistémologie pour trai-
ter de tout ce qui a de la valeur pour la science, Mario Bunge a sys-
tématiquement construit une épistémologie détaillée et approfon-
die. La stratégie argumentative consistera à montrer (a) qu’il est faux
que nous n’avons jamais été modernes (b) que l’épistémologie est là
pour de bon et (c) que Mario Bunge soutient un réalisme scientifique
fort, une version du matérialisme, du systémisme et de l’émergen-
tisme, comportant une dimension morale (il existe des valeurs objec-
tives comme la vérité, la paix et la justice qui méritent d’être étu-
diées). Ensuite, le réalisme de Bunge rejette la neutralité axiologique
rendant les scientifiques responsables de leurs actions. Bunge a tou-
jours été moderne et continue à enrichir ses propres positions.
ABSTRACT — The main claim of this study is that, contrary to Latour’s
view about the need to leave aside epistemology to deal with
anything valuable about science, Mario Bunge has consistently built
up a detailed and thorough epistemology. The argumentative stra-
tegy will be to show that (a) it is not true that we have never been
modern, (b) epistemology is here to stay, and (c) Mario Bunge en-
dorses a strong scientific realism, a brand of materialism, systemism
and emergentism, including a moral dimension (there are objective
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values like, truth, peace and justice that deserve to be respected).
Then, Bunge’s realism rejects axiological neutrality making scientists
responsible for their actions. Bunge has always been modern and
keeps enriching his own views.
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1 EQUIVOCITY OF THE TERM “MODERNITY”
Latour recognizes that “with the adjective modern a new regime is desi-
gnated, an acceleration, a rupture, a revolution of time”2. But it always
involves a contrast with an archaic and stable past. There is implicit a
double asymmetry: an irregular break, and the presence of winners and
losers. On the other hand, there are two types of practice. In one of them,
hybrids are created, such as nature and culture. The second practice is
“purification” where two ontological zones are created, that of humans and
that of non-humans.
It is vital to recognize that, according to Latour, “while we consider
these two practices separately, we are truly modern”3, but if we look at the
purification and hybridization project “we are no longer totally modern”4.
The book has to try to show that as we always did the second, we have
never been modern. With an additional paradox, the less hybrids are
2 Latour, Nunca fuimos modernos, 2007 [1997], p. 27.
3 Ibid., p. 28.
4 Ibid.
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thought of, the more possible science becomes (but, as conceived by those
who emphasize the separation-purification work).
With an addition: “nobody is really modern if he does not accept to dis-
tance God as much from the game of the laws of nature as those of the
republic”5. The result of all this is that science corresponds to the repre-
sentation of non-human, forbidden any appeal to politics, while the latter
corresponds to the representation of citizens, but without relating them to
what is produced by science6.
If we ask, with Latour, what there is, the answer is “hybrids” that
through time are drawing skeins of politics, economics, technics, law, re-
ligion that multiply themselves.
Given a hybrid (a machine, an ozone hole, etc.), it is required to follow
its march through history; the notion of “net” is Ariadne’s thread of all
these mixed stories. The modern thinkers “break” the net into three parts,
nature, politic and speeches. If this partition is not done, there is no sepa-
ration between facts and their social context, but their inclusion-imbrica-
tion in each of the “moments” of the net.
Latour also claims that against usual characterizations, “modernity
has nothing to do with the invention of humanism, the irruption of the
sciences, the laicization of society or the mechanization of the world”7.
We, for our part, believe that modernity has a lot to do with all of these,
but that is not necessarily all. For example, Richard Westfall, a specialist
in the history of modern science states that the move to modernity (in
science, of course) is a step to scientific realism8. What is also a wild
exaggeration is to deny the presence in modernity of humanism, mechani-
zation, etc.
But there is more: “when we see them, i.e. the revolutions, in ‘network’
… there is no way to build a history of radical rupture … of misfortunes
5 Ibid., p. 59.
6 This is a sort of a fairy tale about modernity. In the real world, it happened something totally
different. On the one hand, distinguished scientists (Einstein, Darwin) and philosophers of
science (Neurath, Putnam, Kitcher) acknowledge that ethical and political values might influence
scientific activity. On the other hand, politicians have consistently used science for legitimating
their decisions.
7 Latour, Nunca fuimos modernos, 2007 [1997], p. 62.
8 Westfall, La construcción de la ciencia moderna, 1980 [1977].
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or irreversible sayings…”9. In other words, the modern concept of revolu-
tion is abandoned, in the scientific, political, etc. domains.
And, with it, all modern versions of progress disappear, with radical
changes and progress towards the future. But, with the distorting addition
introduced by Latour that “everything that happens is eliminated forever
so that the moderns have the sensation of an irreversible arrow of time, of
a capitalization, of a progress”10.
All this creative paraphernalia of an alternative version of modernity
and what it is to be modern, culminates in claiming that “ … what we are
incapable of doing, now we know it, is really a revolution, be it in science,
in technique, in politics, in philosophy”11. This is, perhaps, the most mo-
numental counterfactual ever perpetrated by any intellectual.
2 THE DEATH SENTENCE FOR EPISTEMOLOGY
One is tempted to add that everything said by Latour is opposed to what
we have learnt in the history of science courses, especially in courses of
epistemology on positivism, popperianism, Tom Kuhn, Lakatos, and so on.
What happens is precisely that Latour proposes that “it is necessary to
return to anthropology capable of studying science overcoming the limits
of the sociology of knowledge and, above all, of epistemology”12. Observe,
that by decree, Latour, has ruled out not only epistemology but the entire
sociology of science, one of which, at one time, he himself defended.
The great problem that Latour faces is that the great scientists, from
Aristotle to Einstein, visualize the development of sciences in terms much
closer to those of the epistemology and philosophy of science than to La-
tour’s renewed anthropology that when dealing with famous cases in the
history of science commits elementary interpretative mistakes. We will
return to this when referring to the answer that Bunge would give to La-
tour’s interpretation of special relativity.
9 Latour, Nunca fuimos modernos, 2007 [1997], p. 79.
10 Ibid., p. 104.
11 Ibid., p. 105.
12 Ibid., p. 138.
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As it could not be otherwise, Latour explicitly reiterates that “we con-
tinue to believe in the sciences, but instead of taking them in their objec-
tivity, their truth, their extraterritoriality, qualities that they never had
but by the arbitrary recovery of epistemology…”13. That is to say that from
Aristotle to Einstein, passing through the modern philosophers, all, while
explicitly handling concepts such as truth, explanation, objectivity, etc.,
were wrong and they told us a story that we must replace by the hodge-
podge of hybrids, networks, etc.
 However, in that case, they cannot give an acceptable account of what
the scientists are doing anytime they are attempting to reach the truth, to
explain successfully, to predict with increasing accuracy, etc.
But the worst thing, from the perspective not only of the philosophy of
science, but of the human pretension to understand, is that Latour’s ver-
sion does not tell us everything or the most crucial thing to understand
what scientists do in their practice leading to advance hypotheses and de-
cide whether to accept them without reducing that process to negotiations
decided by just power. That explains Latour’s failure for explaining para-
digmatic scientific examples.
2.1 LATOUR ON SPECIAL RELATIVITY
By way of example let us consider his version of the special theory of rela-
tivity14.
His central thesis is that the theory of relativity is “social from end to
end.” This is because it is about (a) how events are measured in different
inertial systems using observers on trains that move at great speed with
respect to observers at a station, and (b) transport information without
deformation from one human observer to another, so that the problems
generated by the different location of the observers arise.
All these statements show that Latour has not the slightest idea of
what Einstein holds. On the one hand, the presence of human observers
is not an essential requirement for the theory. Einstein mentions them in
the public version, but not in the 1905 work on special relativity, as mere
rhetorical devices. The important things in 1905 are the laws of
13 Ibid., p. 207.
14 Latour, « A Relativistic Account of Einstein’s Relativity », 1988, p. 3‑44.
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transformation that Einstein proposes with the important consequences
about the relativity of spatial and temporal measurements, the constancy
of the speed of light in inertial systems, the new law of addition of speeds,
as well as the fundamental proposal that all the laws of physics (not only
the mechanical ones) are invariant with respect to the inertial systems of
reference. None of this is mentioned by Latour.
Instead, Latour states that “the book is about how we send an actor
from one reference system to another. Instead of describing nature’s laws,
it is a book of semiotics, which tries to understand how any narration is
constructed.”15 Our answer is that Einstein can totally dispense with the
actors, and that the laws of nature are a priority theme of the book which
has nothing to do with semiotic recommendations such as narrative pres-
criptions.
Lamentably, Latour also invents a “third observer” (in addition to the
observer in the train and in the station), that obviously Einstein never
mentioned or assumed. Such a third observer “is the author or one of his
representatives [telling the story of what happens with the other two ob-
servers] who tries to superimpose the observations sent by the other
two”16. This is grotesque, because postulating the existence of a third ob-
server who plays according to Latour the role of a privileged observer, is
inconsistent with the very meaning of Einsteinian special relativity
(where there is no inertial reference system of privileged observers).
According to Latour, special relativity is, like any scientific theory, a
social construction. Why? Latour’s response is chilling: the main observer
is the third observer, since it is this one that allows “the control of the
privileges to discipline docile bodies, as Foucault would say”17. Our final
comment is, “Enough is enough”.
This seems to be a paradigmatic example of what happens when scien-
tific rationality is abandoned vociferously, as Latour does: the pretension
of objectivity also disappears as well as the assumption that the empirical
world is the reference to which we try to elucidate scientific hypotheses
and theories. It is also gone that it makes sense to speak of true knowledge
15 Ibid., p. 9.
16 Ibid., p. 11.
17 Ibid., p. 15.
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or pretense of being true about that world. It is left for later, the growing
and almost indispensable relationship between such knowledge and its
progress and the exponential growth of the incidence of technology in the
life of human societies and their survival. As we will see, Latour’s contri-
bution, in this respect, is less praiseworthy because it is almost nonexis-
tent.
However, what is affirmed is not to the detriment of the large crowd of
commentators of his work. Among them, there are pragmatists postmo-
dernists (although Latour rejects postmodernism), and Foucault18, and
even followers of Heidegger and phenomenology19.
This forces us to ask ourselves who obviously criticizes his position.
Undoubtedly scientific realist scientists and philosophers of science, and
especially a distinguished contemporary representative of them, Mario
Bunge, does it.
We have dealt with Bunge’s strong critical rejection of Latour’s social
constructivism20. We must now focus on what we consider to be his most
important disagreements with the thesis that “we have never been mo-
dern.”
3 MARIO BUNGE: THE COUNTER-FIGURE TO “WE HAVE NEVER
BEEN MODERN”
Let us recall Kant’s notes about the Enlightenment21, which are also cited
by Latour, and that we believe are fully satisfied by the work and intellec-
tual performance of Mario Bunge:
Daring to know, what involves daring to change, to think for itself without
being founded on any authority and especially without reference to theo-
logical or divine entities.
18 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 1980.
19 Without identifying or even making them similar, postmodernism and social constructivism
share some of their most fundamental notes. For example (a) their negative attitude about mo-
dernity, no matter that it is more extreme in Latour than in any postmodern philosopher, (b) the
dismissal of the modern concepts of modernity like truth, progress, revolution, (c) the conserva-
tive attitude about the social consequences of the use of science and technology.
20 Gómez, « Contra la mala ciencia y peor filosofía », 2000, p. 117‑38.
21 Kant, ¿Qué es Ilustración?, 1989 [1784].
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In addition, the deep belief in scientific progress and that the latter is a pro-
moter of social progress. Such progress is the result of the rational activity
of humans in their cognitive approach to nature and social reality which
makes it possible to put it at the service of humanity.
If we add to this the normative trilogy of the modern political revolution,
i.e. freedom, equality and fraternity, we obtain the modern characteriza-
tion of the human being as the architect of his own destiny and progress
through the use of reason to know and dominate nature and achieve the
rational organization of society.
If these notes are accepted, there is no doubt that Bunge does not abjure
any of them, whereas Latour does it, insofar as, for example, he strongly
criticizes rationality and progress through critical activity with the pre-
sence of revolutionary ruptures22.
There is no doubt: in terms of this characterization, Bunge is archety-
pally modern while Latour is not. They were also modern Galileo, Marx,
Einstein, Planck, Bohr, and many others. Therefore, it is not true that we
have never been modern. This strange thesis is the result of a characteri-
zation of modernity that would make possible such a wrong interpretation.
Someone can affirm that we are in the presence of two stories about us,
one by Latour and the other by historians and philosophers of science. And
both are conceived as defendable ones.
We are opposed to accept this escape route because, in our opinion, the
former has as its ultimate objective to declare by decree the death of the
philosophy of science. In other words, it would mean the end of a tradition
that has accompanied humanity since its inception, precisely the one that
makes possible criticism and the need to evolve (another notion rejected
by Latour) through changes, those that culminated in science and techno-
logy as engines of human progress. In other words, the tradition that is to
culminate in the scientific, political and social modernity.
Another general way of rejecting Latour’s proposal about never being
modern is by handling the obvious argument that he is accepting:
22 See Cohen, Revolution in Science, 1987, for a careful analysis of the history of the idea of scien-
tific revolution and how it was gradually transformed for encompassing political revolutions.
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(P1) If we have been modern, then we believe that there are ruptures,
i.e., revolutions in the scientific development, and that the notions of truth
and objectivity play a crucial role in a sound version of that development.
(P2) However, there are not truly big ruptures (revolutionary breaks),
and truth (as correspondence as well as objectivity) do not actually take
place in a sound version of scientific development.
From (1) and (2), it follows that we have never been modern.
However, the problem is with (P2). It is hard to believe; it seems like a
sort of a sudden by-product of Latour’s imagination. But, according to him,
we should believe it, because, as he explicitly affirms, the existence of re-
volutions, the role of truth in scientific research and the relevance of ob-
jectivity are just inventions of epistemology.
By a single stroke, Latour makes that those who like the great scien-
tist, speak of revolutions, truth and objectivity, have taken part in a sort
of imaginary concoction.
However, that sounds, at least, like insulting and unbelievable.
Someone might say that scientists make mistakes. Sure, but people like
Latour, also. Then the question is who do we trust? In other words, who is
more credible about science and its development: great physicists like
Einstein or a master of distorting how important scientific theories are,
like Latour?
Here we arrived at the ending point: Everyone interested in the issue
should make a choice. I have already made mine: (P2) is blatantly false.
Have we ever been modern? No way!
Look at what follows about Mario Bunge.
3.1 BUNGEAN REALISM
As an example of the main core of that sort of realism, it is unavoidable to
mention some of the fifteen characteristics that Bunge considers to be
specific to scientific knowledge:
1. It is explanatory and predictive;
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2. It is capable of progress. The modern scientist is a generator of
problems, loves the truth, tries to prove new and uncertain,
makes mistakes and learns from them;
3. It is useful and also represents social advances.
Bunge clarifies that technology consists of the treatment of practical pro-
blems through a scientific approach, which can also offer growth through
the invention of new theories or research techniques.
More important than all of this is Bunge’s strong attachment to the
distinctive and separating note of the Medioevo from modernity; the key
break is about the cognitive value of laws and scientific theories: they pass
from mere predictive instruments to statements about the reality of the
natural world23.
Bunge, of course, is more modern than most of his colleagues in that
regard because he defends a particular form of realism that has been cha-
racterized as “bungean realism”, understood as a variety of scientific rea-
lism conceived by Bunge as a form of hyperrealism that goes hand in hand
with the realistic ontological thesis, also being “materialist, systematic
and emergentist”24.
Bunge affirms that the main assumption of materialism is that “all ma-
terial things and only them, together with their properties and changes
are real”25. The systemic hypothesis can be stated as follows: all properties
are given in packages, not isolated from each other. This implies that all
entities are already systems, already current or potential constituents of
systems, such as cells and genes. What is in reality is therefore a system
or a component of such. Systemism is therefore a structural vision of
something that in the case of systemic materialism is composed of matter.
Furthermore, as we will point out below, insofar as bungean realism is
also valid for ethics and politics, it deals, for example, with “value
23 Galileo is then the first representative of modern scientific realism. To defend heliocentrism
(Copernicus) was not enough for becoming a modern scientist insofar as he was outspokenly an
instrumentalist just as the medieval astronomers were.
24 According to Bunge, scientific realism is one of the defining notes of the Scientific Revolution “
… the scientific revolution was much more than a new view of science: it also included a new
cosmovision, mechanicism, and a new gnoseology, scientific realism” (Bunge, A la caza de la rea-
lidad, 2012 [2006], p. 74).
25 Bunge, Memorias, 2014, p. 56.
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packages, such as freedom, equality and fraternity, instead of isolated va-
lues”26. This can be taken into account to criticize the neoliberalism that
considers as a supreme value the free market, without discussing in detail
the price that is paid in terms of equality and fraternity27.
Being systemic, the bungean materialism is “emergentist”: “every sys-
tem has properties that lack their constituents, starting with their com-
position”28. The explicit corollary is “the existence of several levels of rea-
lity, each of which has emerged from preceding levels in the course of a
process”29.
Bunge also talks about seven aspects of such realism: ontological,
gnoseological, semantic, methodological, axiological, moral and praxiolo-
gical. The extension of realism to all those levels or dimensions is in itself
a very rich novelty in contemporary realism.
Ontological realism affirms the existence of the world independently of
the knowing subject in which things and facts are studied through “cons-
tructs” (data, hypothesis, models and theories). The existence of the out-
side world is “shown” by the presence of our errors, which makes explicit
that there is something different from us and that it is not constructed.
Everything we know of that world has an emergent property, against phy-
sicalism, which gives rise to a philosophy of mind and social philosophy.
Gnoseological realism presupposes the ontological as it states that rea-
lity is knowable, although it is an imperfect knowledge but always perfec-
tible so that scientific hypotheses can be corrected to approximate the
truth. The knowledge of the world is therefore always incomplete, indirect
and fallible. Such realism is therefore not naive in that it does not deny
the possible existence of errors in the act of knowing.
Moreover, the presence of metaphysical assumptions is unavoidable as
well as that of auxiliary hypotheses to enable empirical testing.
26 Ibid., p. 235.
27 Milton Friedman’s view about the issue is the most honest recognition that any question about
inequality and social justice (1967) should remain out of the sphere of economics. Consistently,
the market (the Big Game) is beyond good and evil and no one is responsible for those who are
the losers, i.e. the poor.
28 Bunge, Memorias, 2014, p. 235.
29 Ibid.
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Semantic realism holds that some propositions are about facts and not
just about ideas, that some are approximate to the truth and that every
approach is perfectible.
The strong thesis is that only those facts described by variables in-
cluded in the laws of a theory are considered genuine references of that
theory. For example, quantum mechanics does not refer to subjects of any
kind because they do not appear in their laws, which makes the Copenha-
gen interpretations wrong.
While a correspondence theory of truth is assumed, truth values only
emerge in the testing of the theory; there are therefore no inherent values
of truth of a proposition because it can change with time.
Methodological realism assumes, on the one hand, that the scientific
method consists of a general strategy of knowledge acquisition that in-
volves experience, reason and imagination, on the other hand, the testing
is global, affecting the whole theory. The explanation of regularities al-
ways requires, for being reliable, that it be through mechanisms.
3.2 BUNGEAN REALISM AND QUANTUM MECHANICS
These types of realism so far mentioned converge in Bunge’s treatment of
quantum mechanics. It is here that the novelty of Bungean realism, es-
pecially ontological and epistemological, appears explicitly. The formalism
of quantum mechanics must be interpreted as being about very particular
entities of nature that exist independently of the knowing subject. Bunge
calls quanton such sui generis entities30. Their main characteristic is that
they are fuzzy entities; this means that the physical world is not composed
only of entities whose properties always have precise values. For example,
the values of the electric charge can be defined at any moment with preci-
sion, but position, momentum and energy of the quantons are normally
undefined (fuzzy) in the sense that their values are numerical ranges ins-
tead of unique numbers.
This specific character of the quantons differentiates Bunge’s position
from those that, according to him, such as Einstein’s, are not truly realis-
tic, since by holding that all entities in the world are always measurable,
they could not cover the quantons. Einstein, according to Bunge, does not
30 Bunge, Epistemology III (1) : Formal and Physical Sciences, 1985, p. 171.
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hold a realistic position but a classicist one because he believes that ulti-
mately all entities are describable by classical or neoclassical theories.
In summary: Bunge believes that quantum mechanics describes a very
special world (as opposed to the Copenhagen interpretation) composed of
real entities unknown to classical physics whose states are described by
state functions that they are not directly observable.
As a consequence, Bunge proposes a different version of the interpre-
tation of, for example, the principle of indeterminacy of quantum me-
chanics. Bunge affirms that such a principle “relates the standard devia-
tion of the position and momentum of a quantum in any arbitrary state
and any moment of time”31. Note that for Bunge “the observer is not
among the referents of quantum theory and the apparatus appears only
when it is explicitly represented in the state function of the system”32.
 Heisenberg’s indeterminacy inequality expresses a nonclassical objec-
tive property of the quanton that “has nothing to do with measurements
or mental states … [emphasizing] that quantons are not punctual par-
ticles … [and therefore] have no precise trajectories”33. Therefore, what
the principle does is to reveal a new mode of behavior in the orb.
Consistent with the above, Bunge argues that Bell’s work, by showing
that quantum mechanics violates Bell’s inequalities, implies that no
theory of local hidden variables can reproduce all the predictions of quan-
tum mechanics. Bunge argues that Bell’s work emphasizes that the objec-
tive of a theory of hidden variables of restoring realism failed, but that
objective can be achieved without appealing to such variables. The realism
left out of the scene is that which, like the EPR, assumes localism (distant
things always behave independently of one another) and determinism.
But it does not allow us to conclude that the failure of Bell’s inequalities
in quantum mechanics has refuted the philosophical realism according to
which the physical world exists without help from those who want to know
it, against the interpretation of Heisenberg or Bohr that Bunge considered
out of place to account for the epistemological status of quantum me-
chanics.
31 Ibid., p. 181.
32 Ibid., p. 191.
33 Ibid., p. 182. See, for example, Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, 1958.
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From the ontological point of view, Bunge believes that there is a kind
of systemic holism (for example, given two quantons that are initially
parts of a system, the state of each component is not only determined by
local conditions but also by still belonging to a system). That is, physical
separation implies spatial separation, but the converse is not true. Bunge,
unlike classicists like Einstein, accepts distant correlations so if there are
certain quantons being part of a system they always will be.
3.3 AXIOLOGICAL AND PRACTICAL REALISM
It assumes that there are “objective values”, those rooted in biological and
social needs. They are attackable and defensible in a rational way with
the help of scientific knowledge. These values include health, knowledge,
security and peace, among others. They are not absolute and tensions may
arise between them. It is remarkable that Bunge affirms that axiological
neutrality is not desirable or always possible since there are objective va-
lues worthy of being protected such as truth, justice and peace. Note that
the values Bunge speaks of are not only epistemic.
Practical realism proposes that while there are medium-end pairs and
there are objectively more efficient means to achieve certain ends, and as
our actions may affect third parties, we have, therefore, to take into ac-
count the foreseeable consequences. Ergo, practical realism has to submit
to a principle of responsibility.
To conclude: It is important to emphasize the strong character of this
scientific realism, which encompasses much more than the cognitive di-
mension of human activity.
It should also be clarified that in philosophy of mathematics Bunge is
not a realist of any kind but defends a moderated “fictionism”, while in
aesthetics he considers realism a conservative position, and in politics as
a form of “political cynicism” so that he rejects it openly.
Be aware that all these notes that characterize Bunge’s position, not
only involve a strong attachment to the epistemological approach but, es-
pecially, that his notes of scientific realism and science are exactly oppo-
site to those that Latour denies to modernity with which never, according
to him, were we related: truth, change, progress, rationality, among
others.
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We cannot fail to mention, in this regard, that the Latourian elucida-
tion of artifacts, those that have basically changed the ontology of the
world in which we live and do science, is even more susceptible to being
rejected by Mario Bunge.
3.4 A SHORT REMARK ABOUT TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY
We believe it is important to highlight two aspects of the enormous diffe-
rences in this respect between both authors. Mario Bunge, undoubtedly
the philosopher who introduced the philosophy of technology in the His-
pano-American world, believes that this philosophy consists of five funda-
mental components: techno-metaphysics, which deals with discussing the
status of artifacts, techno-epistemology, which discusses the distinctive
characteristics of technological knowledge, techno-axiology, occupied with
the distinctive characteristics of the values present in the decisions re-
lated to the knowledge and use of artifacts, techno-ethics that discusses
how to elucidate the positive character (good or not) of artifacts and their
knowledge and use, and techno-praxiology, whose main theme is that of
technological rationality. Of course, there has been different views about
technology, from Aristotle through Marxism and neo-Marxism: the opti-
mism of the majority of those who deal with applied science; the pessi-
mism of Ellul34, and the contemporary versions such as Feenberg35 and
Winner36.
Then, just as Latour rejects as irrelevant any discussion about the
scope of the different philosophies of science, because all philosophy in this
respect must be replaced by an anthropological-scientific approach,
something analogous happens to the philosophy of technology. Hence any
discussion about positions since Aristotle, Marxists and contemporary
philosophers disappears in his work.
This, of course, does not prevent the philosophers of technology from
eventually referring to Latour. Thus, Winner, from a philosophical stance
with technological pessimistic tints, criticizes Latour’s position on the so-
cial constructivism of technology. First, it highlights the imperialist
34 Ellul, « The Technological Order », 1983.
35 Feenberg, « Democratic Rationalization », 2014.
36 Winner, « Do Artifacts Have Politics? », 2014.
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pretension of Latour’s approach because it aims to open the black box of
technology throughout history to its current state37.
Without considering the summary and critiques of Latour’s position by
Winner, it is essential to emphasize what he considers to be the most ob-
vious defect of sociological constructivism: “an almost total disregard for
the social consequences of technical choice”38. That is, it neither took into
account the quality of daily life that is generated by choice or decision, nor
the distribution of power in society, the texture of human communities,
social relations, etc. Winner also wonders what happens to groups that
have no voice but are affected by the results of technological change and
what happens to groups that have been deliberately excluded.
Winner is proposing, without saying it, that Latour’s position is an ob-
vious form of elitism. More than that: Winner stresses that by not taking
into account the social consequences (consequences to change society and
those that do not affect it socially), what is offered is an implicitly conser-
vative version of society and politics. Latour’s version, therefore, conceals
as much as it reveals; for example, nothing is said about which groups
“have been left out of the laboratory and which voices have been silenced.”
Nor is an “evaluative stance,” or any kind of ethical or political principle,
that helps people judging possibilities open by technologies.
 That is to say, the sociological constructivism is agnostic about the
evil-good that they accrue or accompany (linked to particular technological
achievements). More briefly and emphatically: social constructivism does
not have any stance about the relationship between technology and hu-
man welfare. It is actually morally and politically indifferent.
Latour’s social constructivism then looks as an academic point of view
sanitized of any critical posture that might contribute to the critical dis-
cussion about the ethical, political and even ecological dimensions of tech-
nological choice.
Winner concludes that the box opened by Latour and other social cons-
tructivists is obviously empty.
37 Ibid.
38 Winner, « Social Constructivism », 2003, p. 237.
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Enough, again. Latour’s view is totally opposed to the fact of even po-
sing the questions of an ethical and axiological dimension inescapable in
Bunge’s proposal and central to any modern position.
 In addition, such failure in stressing that ethical and axiological di-
mension is in open opposition to the realizability of what Bunge calls “in-
tegral development”, the “statement that the thesis of authentic development
and that benefits the people is not only economic, but also sanitary, cultu-
ral and political”39. This idea “contradicted the two dominant currents of
scientific policy: the economicism defended by economists and the anti-
science preached by both the economists and the right wingers of a new
stamp”.
We cannot fail to mention a masterly statement by Bunge about the
dominant neoliberal economics, the one about which Latour & Co. keep
absolute silence: “standard economic theory is built on vague concepts,
lacks empirical support, does not serve to face the crisis because it as-
sumes that the economy is always in balance and disregards the suffering
caused by poverty, inequality, unemployment and economic crises” 40 .
Otherwise, Bunge, the modern, deals with something that Latour disre-
gards: Everything related to a more fortunate future of the people.
4 BUNGEAN MORAL REALISM: THE HARD-CORE OF
EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROGRESS
Bunge strongly believes in the existence of epistemological progress.
There is epistemological progress every time a certain epistemology allows
a better understanding of the contemporary state of science (or of a certain
science) also realizing that the corresponding scientific development is
also progressive.
More clearly: A paradigmatic example of that progress is the obvious
fact that in the last twenty years, at least, a thesis that reduces and im-
poverishes the complexity of scientific activity has been demystified. Until
the nineties of the last century it was a kind of mortal sin to affirm that
the scientific activity is loaded with both epistemic and non-epistemic
39 Bunge, A la caza de la realidad, 2012 [2006], p. 316.
40 Ibid.
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values (peace, the well-being of a certain group, etc.). This was the conse-
quence of the maintenance of two founding myths: the dichotomy of fac-
tual judgments/value judgments, and the inescapable identification of
scientific objectivity with the evaluative neutrality of the scientific acti-
vity.
Today all this is past. Hallelujah: there is no such a dichotomy41 as evi-
denced in statements like “the Nazis were evil” in which there is an en-
tanglement between the empirical and evaluative content of it. But, as
Bunge will argue, while it is possible to consider that certain values are
objective, the presence of them in a research process does not color it with
any subjectivity. The point is, even as Bob Nozick42, not precisely a scien-
tific realist, stated years ago, that science is objective because of the values
it is infused with.
Mario Bunge has in this regard a solid defense of such objectivity and
a clear elucidation of why the unavoidable presence of values of all kinds
in all contexts, even in the context of justification, does not necessarily
imply the absence of objectivity; everything depends on what values and
how they intervene.
Bunge proposes that “objectivity should not be confused with neutrality
regarding values”43, because, for example, the search for certain values
(such as welfare, peace and security) is preferable to that of others. Such
objectivity is constitutive of scientific realism since the modern scientific
revolution.
It is even deeper, because certain values are objective “because they are
rooted in biological and social needs”44. Therefore, instead of arguing that
the fact/value dichotomy leads to the naturalistic fallacy, Bunge and the
moral realists “consider the fact/value an over-naturalist or irrationalist
fallacy”45. Such objectivity makes it possible for these objective values to
be discussed on scientific grounds.
41 See, for example, Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays, 2002.
42 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1975.
43 Bunge, A la caza de la realidad, 2012 [2006], p. 62.
44 Ibid., p. 363.
45 Ibid., p. 364.
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Therefore, statements containing objective, even moral, values can be
considered as true or false. To do this, they must always be put in context:
“from a situational perspective … lying, stealing and helping others wi-
thout expecting a reward are moral facts; and the norms and counter-
norms associated with these facts are true because they conform to the
supreme moral principle: enjoy life and help others live lives worthy of
being enjoyed”46. The quote says it all: moral realism assumes the exis-
tence of moral facts and, therefore, moral truths.
The main example that Bunge uses is more than revealing: “Poverty is
a moral fact, not just a social fact, because it involves unnecessary suffe-
ring and degradation” and “the creation of work is a moral fact not only
an economic fact, because it satisfies the right to work”47.
 Nothing therefore prevents that such moral facts in which every so-
ciety is involved can be studied with the help, not only of factual truths,
but also moral ones.
Without a doubt this constitutes an enormous epistemological progress,
involving a different moral treatment of the considered facts, with respect,
for example, to the neoliberal proposals of Hayek48 and Friedman49. Faced
with the lack of human compassion in all of Hayek’s work proposals on
economics and vociferated in Friedman’s work, Bunge would never nego-
tiate such virtue, human companionship, when seriously analyzing facts
involving it50.
All this seems to be not only epistemological but also moral progress
according to Bungean realism.
Not all truths are true in any context. Moral truths are not, because
they “ultimately concern rights and obligations and since they are related
to a culture and its moral code … therefore, they are contextual”51. In our
Western context, “it is good for us to do good works, unless one has been
educated in the harsh school of orthodox economics, for which selfishness
46 Ibid., p. 365.
47 Ibid.
48 Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, 1967.
49 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 1967.
50 The most explicit examples of Friedman’s extremism about ethics and economics show up in
his most quoted book, Capitalism and Freedom.
51 Bunge, A la caza de la realidad, 2012 [2006], p. 368.
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is the supreme virtue”52. That is, on the one hand, moral truths are con-
textual, on the other hand, there is an enormous distance from Friedman
and neoliberal views about the relationship between economics and ethics
to Bunge’s revival of the relevance of ethics when dealing with economic
issues.
Besides, having a clear view of the contextuality of moral truths re-
quires perceiving that “all moral imperatives can be expressed in the in-
dicative way. The imperative ‘you will not kill’ can be translated as ‘killing
is bad’”. This translation “designates a proposition that is true in every
moral code that affirms the right of persons to life and is false in every
code that does not admit such a right”53.
The most obvious consequence is the possibility of empirical testing of
moral standards. This is possible in three complementary ways: coherence
or compatibility with higher-level principles, compatibility (with the best
common knowledge, scientific or technological available), and contribution
to individual or social well-being54. Like the scientific truths, they are per-
fectible, “what discards the possibility of a perennial ethic, modeled for
perfect humans who live in a perfect society”55.
As a consequence, ethical theories can be tested in a similar way to
scientific theories, i.e. “agreement with the relevant facts and compatibi-
lity with other theories”56.
 Bunge himself allows us to end this section with what we started with:
the categorical denial of the fact/value dichotomy in contemporary episte-
mology: “In short, there are facts and moral truths. The former are part of
the fabric of reality and the moral truths are interwoven with other factual
truths”57.
To conclude: there is no stronger and more welcome version than the
bungean one of the entanglements between science and ethics, especially
in a scientific realist view.
52 Ibid., p. 369.
53 Ibid., p. 371.
54 Ibid., p. 372‑73.
55 Ibid., p. 374.
56 Ibid., p. 375.
57 Ibid., p. 377.
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5 MORAL REALISM AS A CRITICAL FOUNDATION OF THE THEORY
OF RATIONAL CHOICE
It is known that such theory constitutes the unavoidable principle of or-
thodox economics and neoliberalism. It is the one that cannot be abdicated
even though it is falsified by the empirical activity of human beings and
by agents in the market. According to this principle, to act rationally is to
try to maximize the achievement of the goal, and therefore, in the capita-
list market, this means acting efficiently in order to maximize profit.
On the problems cited by Bunge that this principle has it should be
emphasized that (a) real-life actors are very rarely free as assumed in the
theory discussed, (b) they are constrained by social and moral norms.
Therefore, you should not aim to maximize efficiency because you will sa-
crifice other values, such as welfare and environmental protection. Simi-
larly, before the praise of supposed benefits of the globalization of the free
market, it is necessary to discuss how to “correct or compensate for the
growing imbalances it produces”58.
There are deep theoretical problems underlying what Bunge says. The
theory of rational choice assumed by neoclassicism and neoliberalism
takes for granted that we choose, decide and act according to the objective
order of our preferences. However, we could establish, in principle, the
objective order of preferences of an individual, but there is no dependable
way of establishing interpersonal utility comparisons, because the levels
of desire are totally subjective. We could not establish how much more
utility would obtain a consumer of a given good than another consumer of
the same good. We could also not measure in a dependable way the utility
differences for a single individual; for example, statements like “we
achieve three units more of utility from a pear than from a peach” are not
dependable.
Therefore, it cannot use Bentham59 utilitarian formula that considered
a certain result as the best for all the society if it is the greatest sum of
utility of all the members of that society (because this assumes that it is
possible to measure the utility for each individual). Accordingly, the maxi-
mum of utility cannot be used as a normative principle.
58 Ibid., p. 379.
59 Bentham, A Fragment on Government, 1776.
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Pareto’s criterion came to the rescue: a result A is Pareto-superior to a
result B, if at least an individual in the society prefers A to B, whereas no
one prefers B to A. Moreover, a result for which there is no other result
that would be Pareto-superior is called “Pareto optimum”60. However, this
merely apparent solution is irrelevant because people’s preferences are
not linearly ordered. The standard solution is to use the Kaldor-Hicks cri-
terion61. According to it, a result A is Pareto-superior to a result B if those
who are better in the situation A could compensate those who would be
better in the situation B, and yet would have a net benefit. As a matter of
fact, this criterion favors always those results that involve a bigger quan-
tity to distribute, although some members of the society receive less than
in another situation where it would be less to distribute. Besides, the cri-
terion emphasizes the potential distribution over the actual one; the win-
ner “could” compensate the looser but this does not mean that she should
be committed to do it.
Most importantly is to stress the fact that all this is, then, ethically
neutral and innocuous with respect to the obligation of dealing with the
inequalities. In other words, all this terminological paraphernalia is me-
trically insufficient, because it makes neoclassical and neoliberal econo-
mics ambivalent with respect to elementary problems of inequality. If it
could be decided to distribute half a million dollars of a rich person for
inoculation of poor kids and improve their health, society would be better
in this situation than if the distribution would not have been made; but,
according to the same neoclassical theory, the millionaire would suffer a
certain loss, a loss of utility. There is no way of comparing with any metric,
according to all the neoclassical frame adopted by neoliberalism, the loss
of utility suffered by the millionaire with the one won by those who were
inoculated. But that ambivalence is a political and ethical disaster, be-
cause, as a consequence, in the real practice the final decision is taken by
those with more power. In the most vital issues, from a social point of view,
the assumed scientific rigor disappears and is replaced by voluntarism or
by barbarianism.
60 Pareto, Manual of Political Economy, 1906.
61 Kaldor, « Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility », 1939,
Hicks, « The Foundations of Welfare Economics », 1939.
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The worst outcome is that any question of equality and social justice is
out of the domain of economics, and is not related at all with the evalua-
tion of the behavior of the market and its results.
Therefore, the market is beyond good and evil, and is not responsible—
truly speaking no one is—of those who are annoyed by the market results.
More precisely, the market is beyond any moral judgment.
And that, and precisely that, is a moral disaster that Bunge’s recent
views on moral realism outspokenly denounces and makes him call to
overcome neoclassical and neoliberal economics.
There is much more, such as linking realism and scientism to materia-
lism, obtaining the triad that Bunge calls scientific hylorealism.
However, it is the same empirical reality and its complexity approached
by such hylorealism that invites us to be fair with the reader and to stop
supposing to have shown convincingly the unique character of Mario
Bunge as a philosopher of science for (a) his respect of the reality of which
science is made, (b) its detailed and always updated analysis of it, (c) its
defense of the possibility of knowing it as it is and, especially, (d) its indis-
putable achievement of a global version that does not leave out the ethical
dimension constitutive of human reason.
And this makes him different, much more so when in the twentieth
century two fatal reductionisms had been consummated: first, of philoso-
phy of science to epistemology and second, of the latter to the logic of scien-
tific research thus impoverishing both the reality addressed and its criti-
cal study.
Bunge is a living example of the rejection of those reductionisms. And
mainly, of another even more damaging reduction: that of human reason
to theoretical reason. That means that Bunge has not left out the rational
discussion of our choices and their consequences. In other words, what
modernity called practical reason is back in the domain of science and its
philosophy.
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